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This article analyzes the effects of the timing of elections on the timing and character of adopted inflation
stabilization plans. Multinomial logit estimations show that before elections exchange rate-based stabilizations are
more likely to be implemented than money-based stabilizations, while the opposite is more likely after elections.
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Contrary to the conventional wisdom that inflation stabilization has short-run contractionary
effects, empirical studies focusing on chronic inflation countries have shown that exchange rate-
based stabilization plans (ERBS) often lead to an initial expansion in economic activity,
particularly in output and consumption, with recession occurring later on. The short-run reces-
sionary effects typically associated with disinflation occur more quickly following money-based
stabilizations (MBS). Thus, according to Calvo and Ve´gh (1999); Kiguel and Leviatan (1992), the
choice of the nominal anchor might be interpreted as a choice between recession now and
recession later.
When the decision regarding the anchor and timing of stabilization is included in models of political
business cycles, there is room for political opportunism of policymakers. Following on the work of
Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Stein and Streb (1998) have developed a political model of policymaking in
which voters reward politicians for perceived competence. In their model, inflation reduction with low
output costs signals competence of the government. Thus, the absence of short-run costs of higher
unemployment and lower growth provide strong incentives for policymakers to reduce inflation shortly
before elections by implementing ERBS.
The hypothesis that the timing and the choice of the nominal anchor of a stabilization might
be affected by the timing of elections will be tested via the estimation of a multinomial logit
model for a sample of 35 stabilization programs implemented in chronic inflation countries since
the late 1950s. The potential effects of economic conditions on the adoption of stabilization plans
will also be considered. This approach builds upon and improves upon the work of Aisen (2002),
who uses a probit model to estimate the effects of several variables on the probability of
implementing an ERBS versus an MBS, assuming that the decision to stabilize has already been
made. First, an opportunistic policymaker will not commit to a stabilization program before
knowing whether an ERBS or an MBS are preferable to not stabilizing. Thus, the timing and
anchor of stabilization should be decided at the same time. Second, Veiga (2000) has shown that
the timing of inflation stabilization programs is affected by political variables like the degree of
fragmentation of the political system. It is quite possible that it is also affected by the timing of
elections. By allowing the policymaker the option of not stabilizing, our model has the advantage
of also estimating the effects of the timing of elections and of several economic variables on the
timing of stabilizations.2. The data and the econometric model
The dataset is composed of quarterly data from 1957 to 1999, for 10 countries that
experienced chronic inflation and implemented stabilization programs during this period. In order
to determine when a stabilization program has been implemented, we searched the economics
literature for information on the starting dates of stabilization programs undertaken in countries
suffering from chronic inflation. The 44 stabilizations identified are described in Table 1, where
the quarter of implementation, the type and the importance of each program are indicated. Those
classified as major programs are the ones that received greatest attention in the economics
literature.
Since we are interested in testing whether the electoral cycle affects the choice of the nominal anchor
and the timing of stabilization, only the programs whose implementation was preceded and followed by
elections are included in the sample. Thus, periods in which the political regime was not democratic are
excluded. These stabilizations are indicated in bold in the text of the table. Because it makes more sense
to test for the probability of implementing a stabilization program when it is clearly necessary, we
decided to examine only periods in which inflation was ‘‘high’’. Following Veiga (2000), inflation was
considered high when it was over twice the average inflation rate of the last 10 years (and above 25%) or
greater than or equal to 100%.
We assumed that, in a situation of high inflation, the policymaker could do one of the following: (1)
start an ERBS; (2) start an MBS; or postpone the necessary stabilization program (NS, no stabilization).
Table 1
Stabilization programs
Country Program dates/names Type Major program
Argentina 1958:4 MBS
1959:3 ERBS Yes
1967:1 ERBS Yes
1973:3 ERBS Yes
1976:2 MBS
1978:4 (Tablita) ERBS Yes
1985:2 (Austral I) ERBS Yes
1986:3 (Primavera I) ERBS
1987:1 (February) ERBS
1987:4 (Austral II) ERBS
1988:3 (Primavera II) ERBS
1989:3 (BB) ERBS
1989:4 (Bonex) MBS Yes
1991:2 (Convertibility) ERBS Yes
Bolivia 1982:4 ERBS
1984:2 ERBS
1985:1 ERBS
1985:3 ERBS Yes
Brazil 1964:1 ERBS Yes
1986:1 (Cruzado) ERBS Yes
1987:2 (Bresser) ERBS
1988:2 (Gradualist) ERBS
1989:1 (Summer) ERBS
1990:1 (Collor) MBS Yes
1994:3 (Real) ERBS Yes
Chile 1975:2 MBS Yes
1978:1 (Tablita) ERBS Yes
Dominican Republic 1990:3 MBS Yes
Israel 1980:4 (Aridor I) ERBS
1982:3 (Aridor II) ERBS
1983:4 (Cohen-Orgad) ERBS
1984:3 (Package Deal I) ERBS
1984:4 (Package Deal II) ERBS
1985:1 (Package Deal III) ERBS
1985:3 (Shekel) ERBS Yes
Mexico 1976:4 ERBS
1987:4 ERBS Yes
Peru 1985:3 ERBS
1990:3 MBS Yes
Uruguay 1960:4 MBS Yes
1968:2 ERBS Yes
1978:4 (Tablita) ERBS Yes
1990:4 ERBS Yes
Turkey 1980:1 MBS Yes
Notes: ERBS, exchange rate-based stabilization; MBS, money-based stabilization. The programs whose date/name appears in
bold were implemented during election cycles. The others were implemented during dictatorships or followed by dictatorships.
Main sources: Bruno et al. (1988); Bruno et al. (1991); Calvo and Ve´gh (1999); Kiguel and Leviatan (1992). See Table 1 of
Castro and Veiga (2002) for the specific source used to classify each program.
Table 2
Description of the variables used
Dependent variable:
STAB= 0 if NS program is implemented in the current quarter,
= 1 if an MBS is implemented, and
= 2 if an ERBS is implemented.
Independent variables
PCR, number of quarters since the last elections divided by the number of quarters to the next elections (presidential elections
are considered in presidential systems, while legislative elections are considered in parliamentary systems).
TR/Imp, ratio of total reserves to imports.
DInf, change in inflation: DInf = ln(Inf) ln(Inf( 1))
Inf, inflation: growth of CPI since the same quarter of the previous year.
GDP>T= 1 if the growth of real GDP since the same quarter of the previous year is greater than the Trend (Hodrick–Prescott)
growth rate of GDP.
FB/GDP, fiscal balance (government budget balance) as a percentage of GDP.
IMFProg = 1 if there is an ongoing IMF program (arrangement), and = 0 otherwise.
Sources: Dependent variable: see Table 1. Independent variables: Arthur Banks, ed., Political Handbook of the World, several
issues; World Europa Yearbook, Europa, several issues; International Financial Statistics, IMF. Quarterly data on Real GDP
was also obtained from IBGE (Brazil) and INEGI (Mexico). Data on the timing of IMF arrangements was obtained from the
IMF Annual Report (several issues) and on the IMF web page (http://www.imf.org).Since there are three alternatives, the econometric model chosen was the Multinomial Logit1. The
dependent variable and the independent variables are described in Table 2.3. Empirical results
Table 3 presents the results of the multinomial logit estimations for the contrasts MBS versus NS,
ERBS versus NS, and MBS versus ERBS, for all and major programs. Most economic variables are
lagged one period in order to avoid simultaneity problems and to account for the usual delays in the
reporting of economic data. For each estimated coefficient, the factor change in the odds2 and the t-
statistics are also provided.
The political cycle ratio (PCR) (quarters since the last election divided by quarters before the next
election), is statistically significant for the first and last contrasts in both specifications, indicating that the
probability of adopting an MBS decreases (relative to NS and to ERBS) as elections come closer3. These
results clearly support our hypothesis and are consistent with the opportunistic behavior of policymakers
described in Stein and Streb’s (1998) model. PCR is not statistically significant for the contrast ERBS/NS,
indicating that the timing of elections may not affect the decision to adopt an ERBS versus not stabilizing.
In fact, there is greater dispersion of ERBS along the election cycle than that of MBS. When the choice
concerns the nominal anchor of stabilization, as expected, the probability of adopting an MBS versus an
ERBS is greater when PCR is smaller (shortly after elections).2 The factor change in the odds (also called odds ratio) represents generically the expected change in the odds of outcome m
versus outcome n for a unit change in the variable Xk, and is equal to exp(bk,mjn).
3 In terms of odds ratios, we can see that for the contrast MBS/ERBS, in the specification for all programs, a unit change in
PCR leads to an expected change of the odds by a factor of 0.0427, ceteris paribus.
1 For a description of this model see Long (1997).
Table 3
Timing and choice of the nominal anchor of stabilization programs
All programs Major programs
MBS/NS ERBS/NS MBS/ERBS MBS/NS ERBS/NS MBS/ERBS
PCR  3.22945  0.076848  3.15260  3.97782  0.062806  3.91501
[0.0396] [0.9260] [0.0427] [0.0187] [0.9391] [0.0199]
( 3.33)*** ( 1.27) ( 3.25)*** ( 2.92)*** ( 0.72) ( 2.87)***
TR/Imp( 1)  1.55898 0.459502  2.01848  0.961667 0.394075  1.35574
[0.2104] [1.5833] [0.1329] [0.3823] [1.4830] [0.2578]
( 2.36)** (1.92)* ( 2.93)*** ( 2.57)** (0.93) ( 2.54)**
DInf( 1) 3.52144 0.050426 3.47101 3.05818  1.93714 4.99532
[33.833] [1.0517] [32.169] [21.289] [0.1441] [147.72]
(1.89)* (0.05) (1.65)* (1.77)* ( 1.74)* (2.45)**
GDP>T( 1) 1.86371  0.447610 2.31132 1.61842 0.038071 1.58035
[6.4476] [0.6392] [10.088] [5.0451] [1.0395] [4.8567]
(1.68)* ( 0.98) (1.99)** (1.38) (0.06) (1.21)
FB/GDP( 1)  0.003578  0.147799 0.144221 0.072903  0.017556 0.090460
[0.9964] [0.8626] [1.1551] [1.0756] [0.9826] [1.0947]
( 0.04) ( 4.18)*** (1.43) (0.62) ( 0.33) (0.70)
IMFProg 0.981458  0.509541 1.49100 0.373354 0.802040  0.428687
[2.6683] [0.6008] [4.4415] [1.4526] [2.2301] [0.6514]
 1.07 ( 0.96) (1.45) (0.39) (0.98) ( 0.35)
Log Likelihood  82.9907  52.8209
Schwarz B.I.C. 119.341 90.3170
McFadden R2 0.2074 0.1712
Number of observations 180 212
Number of MBS 6 5
Number of ERBS 29 10
Sources: see Tables 1 and 2. Notes, the factor change in the odds are in brackets; t-statistics are in parentheses; significance level
at which the null hypothesis is rejected: ***, 1%; **, 5%; and *, 10%; models estimated with a constant, by maximum
likelihood (ML). MBS, money-based stabilization; ERBS, exchange rate-based stabilization; NS, no stabilization.
 A greater stock of reserves (TR/Imp) reduces the probability of choosing an MBS relative to an ERBS
or to not stabilizing. In the results for all programs it also increases the probability of implementing an
ERBS relative to not stabilizing. As inflation accelerates (DInf) the probability of implementing an MBS
versus an ERBS or not stabilizing increases. GDP growth above the trend growth rate (GDP>T)
increases the probability of adopting an MBS instead of an ERBS or not stabilizing when we use the
sample of all 35 programs. In the specification for the 15 major programs, this variable is never
statistically significant. These results concerning GDP contradict Gould (1999), who argued that growth
above trend would favor the adoption of an ERBS versus an MBS. The fiscal balance as a percentage of
GDP (FB/GDP) does not seem to affect the choice of the nominal anchor. But, the results for all
programs indicate that a greater budget surplus decreases the probability of implementing an ERBS.
Finally, the existence of an ongoing IMF program (IMFProg) does not seem to affect the timing or the
choice of the nominal anchor of stabilization4.4 See Castro and Veiga (2002) for the results of sensitivity analysis to alternative samples and of a series of robustness tests
using other explanatory variables. Since these results are very similar to those of Table 3, our conclusions regarding the
influence of the political cycle and other variables remain the same.
4. Conclusions
There is clear evidence of opportunistic behavior of policymakers regarding the timing of stabilization
and the choice of the nominal anchor. An MBS is more likely to be implemented shortly after elections,
while the probability of adopting an ERBS is greater shortly before elections. While the results regarding
the choice of the nominal anchor confirm those of Aisen (2002), it should be noted that he assumes that
the choice happens after the decision to stabilize was taken, which implies that the election cycle does
not affect the timing of stabilization. The most evident innovation of this paper is that, by allowing the
policymaker to opt among implementing an MBS, an ERBS or not stabilizing, the effects of the timing
of elections and of other factors on the timing of each type of stabilization programs are also analyzed.
Our results for the contrast MBS/NS clearly show that the timing of an MBS is affected by the electoral
cycle. As previously stated, the probability of adopting an MBS versus not stabilizing is greater
immediately after elections.Acknowledgements
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